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Introduction
In each of the three essays of my dissertation, I identify an ineﬃciency and
oﬀer a remedy that improves welfare. The ﬁrst essay ﬁnds that an ineﬃciency
due to informational asymmetry between a principal and a fraudster can be
prevented by reducing the fraudster’s value of information. The second essay
argues that a market failure in the banking industry can be mitigated by
reducing competition. The third essay shows that welfare can be improved
if political parties agree on a sharing rule ex ante instead of bargaining ex
post. Below, I explain the nature of the ineﬃciencies in more detail and
summarize each of the three essays.
The ﬁrst essay deals with learning in dynamic audit games. I show that
the eﬃcacy of an audit methodology reduces if it is used repeatedly. The
essay builds on the following idea: individuals have an additional incentive
to commit fraud today if they will face the same audit methodology again
tomorrow. By cheating successfully today they discover how to cheat the
system. The possibility of interaction tomorrow makes their discovery valu-
able. For individuals to beneﬁt from their discovery, their fraud should go
undetected. Therefore, the analysis in the ﬁrst essay is applicable to such
types of frauds that have the potential to go undetected, e.g., tax evasion,
ﬁnancial statement manipulation, insurance fraud, and money laundering.
I show that an eﬀective way to prevent repeated fraud is to change the
audit technology each time an individual interacts with it. Switching audit
technologies reduces the fraudster’s incentive to cheat by eliminating the
value of his discovery. Switching the audit technology even to a weaker
technology helps eliminate fraud. In the extreme, the auditor can reduce
fraud by looking away (i.e., refusing to audit) even if the audit costs nothing.
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Changing the audit methodology decreases the would-be fraudster’s incen-
tive to cheat by increasing his costs. Suppose that the individual has already
made an investment to improve his ability to defeat a given auditor. When
the auditor switches his technology, the fraudster has to make the investment
once again. Ultimately, switching decreases the fraudster’s gains. Another
merit of switching is that it enables the auditor to eliminate fraud by setting
a lower penalty. That is, switching is a substitute for a more severe punish-
ment. This feature can be especially useful if the punishment is costly, for
example, due to concerns about false positives.
The principles that allow one to reduce fraud can be applied to many envi-
ronments. Consider a CEO monitored by the same board of directors over
several years. By observing the board members’ reactions to his initiatives,
the CEO can discover deﬁciencies in their monitoring. For example, he can
learn how to design and present proposals (which are not necessarily in line
with shareholders’ objectives) in such a way that they have a greater like-
lihood of being approved. Frequent renewal of board members limits such
learning. Companies audited by the same ﬁrm over time might also learn
how to manipulate their ﬁnancial statements without being caught. Rotating
audit ﬁrms reduces such opportunity.
In some environments it is possible to render the act of fraud more diﬃcult
by improving the audit technology. For example, shareholders might attract
more talented individuals to the board by oﬀering higher salaries and, thus,
monitor the CEO more closely. Notice that switching audit technologies and
improving a given audit technology are substitutes: switching the technology
reduces the value of learning, and improving it increases the cost of cheating.
In both cases the fraudster’s incentive to cheat decreases.
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If switching costs are large, it is better to invest in one strong audit tech-
nology instead of switching among many weak technologies. For example,
if the cost of changing the existing audit ﬁrm (i.e., the loss of the accu-
mulated knowledge) outweighs the beneﬁts of rotation, it might be more
desirable to allocate a bigger budget to have a more comprehensive audit
today than to hire a new audit ﬁrm tomorrow. Likewise, if the cost of the
investment needed to improve the quality of audits increases, the relative
beneﬁt of changing the audit technology also increases. For example, it
might be cheaper for the IRS to reduce fraud by varying the intensity of
screening than by trying to make it more diﬃcult for fraudulent applications
to pass the audit.
In the second essay, I analyze a market failure in the banking industry. In
particular, I show that the competitive market structure encourages banks
to accumulate more liquid funds than is socially desirable. In my model, the
possibility of an exogenous liquidity shock tomorrow prompts banks to raise
liquid funds today. Banks raise funds by selling their assets. As the aggregate
amount of sale increases, output declines because banks accumulate liquid
funds which otherwise would be used in ﬁnancing positive NPV projects.
As a result, the economy suﬀers even before the liquidity shock hits. This
would not happen in an economy managed by a social planner who would
not demand liquidity before the realization of the shock.
Banks’ total demand for cash—and, thus, the severity of the crisis—increases
with the likelihood of the shock and decreases with the cost of obtaining cash.
In my model the price of cash depends on the behavior of other banks and is,
therefore, endogenously determined. Because the buyers of ﬁnancial assets
have to be compensated at an increasing rate to forego their existing positive
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NPV projects, banks need to oﬀer a greater discount if more assets are on
sale. Therefore, each bank imposes a negative externality on other banks
when it sells its assets to raise liquid funds.
The negative externality in obtaining cash is the main reason for the ineﬃ-
ciency in the second essay. Acting as price takers, banks in the competitive
market do not internalize their own impact on the equilibrium terms of trade
when they sell their assets. This encourages them to sell more, which leads
to distortions in the allocation of funds in the economy. Big banks, on the
other hand, internalize their impact and can better time when to obtain
cash. They demand less liquidity and, therefore, divert a smaller amount of
funds from the real assets. That is, they play the role of a moderator and
facilitate a more eﬃcient allocation of resources.
In the third essay, I identify an ineﬃciency caused by the system of checks
and balances. Checks and balances protect minority rights by forcing the
majority to compromise with the minority. I show that such compromises
can lead to ineﬃcient outcomes.
To see how a compromise can be socially ineﬃcient, consider an economic
policy expected to promote stability in the next period. For the policy to
be adopted, it has to be approved by the opposition party. Although both
the ruling and the opposition parties beneﬁt from the policy, it might not be
approved if the policy also implies a political transfer from the opposition
party to the ruling party. In particular, if the transfer is greater than the
beneﬁt the opposition party obtains from the policy, the ruling party needs
to compromise to pass the proposal. The outcome will be suboptimal.
To show how political dynamics force parties to agree on a suboptimal solu-
tion, I construct a two-party bargaining model with the ruling party making
the oﬀer. In particular, the ruling party aims to appoint a strong individual
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to a governmental post. Because the ruling party and its nominees tend to
share the same policy preferences, an appointment of a stronger candidate
also means a larger transfer from the ruling party to the opposition. As a
result a strong candidate meets greater resistance, which creates an ineﬃ-
cient delay in reaching an agreement. In the equilibrium, the parties agree
on a compromised solution, and appoint a weaker candidate than is socially
optimal.
I test the predictions of my model using data on the appointments of U.S.
federal judges. Appointments to the judiciary provide a particularly appro-
priate environment to test the model because they are for life. There is plenty
of evidence that judges learn on the job but become less productive at old
age, so appointments of competent younger judges extend the productive pe-
riod they spend on the bench. At the same time, it is important to take into
account the possibility that older judges may on average be more competent.
I control for nominees’ competence for the bench using the rating assigned
by the American Bar Association. I ﬁnd that the candidate’s conﬁrmation in
the Senate is more likely and faster when the President compromises on the
strength of the candidate by nominating an older individual. These ﬁndings
suggest that the system of checks and balances comes with a price.
5
Please, note. 
The essay 1 within this publication (pp. 6-35) has been omitted due to issues 
related with copyright.
Essay 2
Too Big to Rush
Abstract
A sudden need for liquidity prompts banks to sell their assets at a dis-
count to obtain cash. This sale disturbs the economy and slows down growth
because the buyers of the assets reduce their investments in positive NPV
projects. Small banks do not internalize their own impact on prices, which
encourages them to start a ﬁre sale too early. A (relatively) small probabil-
ity of a liquidity shock might trigger a ﬁre sale, causing a real crisis. Big
banks internalize their own price impact, which reduces the severity of a cri-
sis. Their sale decision is more in line with that of the social planner because
they are too big to rush to sell their assets.
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Sell when you can; you are not for all markets.
– William Shakespeare, As you like it (Act III.5)
3.1 Introduction
Banks, at times, can be too prudent. For example, one of the most strik-
ing features of the recent ﬁnancial crisis is the freeze in the credit market:
instead of lending, banks built up cash reserves and accumulated safe as-
sets.14 Brunnermeier [2009] refers to the freeze in the interbank market as a
textbook example of precautionary hoarding.
When banks hoard cash, fewer positive NPV projects than are socially opti-
mal are ﬁnanced. This hampers growth.15 In this paper, I develop a model
in which competition causes a decline in economic output by encouraging
banks to hoard cash. In the model, banks face the possibility of an exoge-
nous liquidity shock. Output in the economy declines even before the shock
occurs because banks will ﬁnd it optimal to divert funds from the real assets
to satisfy their potential future demand for liquidity.
Hoarding cash today is optimal from the banks’ perspective. However, banks’
individually optimal decisions yield a socially undesirable outcome: the buy-
ers of banks’ assets need to forego their positive NPV projects. As a conse-
quence, while the aggregate level of liquidity goes up, total investments in
the economy go down. Depending on the likelihood of the shock, a real crisis
might occur even before the realization of the shock. That is, banks might
14See, for instance, Ashcraft et al. [2011], Acharya and Merrouche [2012], and Berrospide
[2013] for empirical evidence.
15Even representatives of two diametrically opposite schools of thought, Hayek [1932] and
Keynes [1932], agree that the economy is hurt when agents hoard cash. This opinion has been
echoed, among others, by Friedman and Schwartz [1963] and Bernanke [2010].
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trigger a crisis endogenously by rushing to obtain liquidity. This would not
happen in an economy managed by a social planner who would not demand
liquidity before the realization of the shock.
Banks’ total demand for cash—and, thus, the severity of the crisis—increases
with the likelihood of the shock and decreases with the price of cash. In
my model the price of cash depends on the behavior of other banks and
is, therefore, endogenously determined. Because the buyers of the ﬁnancial
assets have to be compensated at an increasing rate to forego their existing
positive NPV projects, banks need to oﬀer a greater discount if more assets in
the market are on sale. Therefore, each bank imposes a negative externality
on other banks when it sells its assets to raise liquid funds.
The negative externality in obtaining cash is the main reason for the in-
eﬃciency in my model. In particular, acting as price takers, banks in the
competitive market do not internalize their own impact on the equilibrium
terms of trade when they sell their assets. This encourages them to sell
more, which leads to distortions in the allocation of funds in the economy.
Big banks, on the other hand, internalize their impact and can better time
when to obtain cash. They demand less liquidity and, therefore, divert a
smaller amount of funds from the real assets. That is, they play the role of
a moderator and facilitate a more eﬃcient allocation.
My paper contributes to the literature studying why banks might abstain
from ﬁnancing the real economy. Diamond and Rajan [2011] explain credit
market freezes with a speculative motive. In their model, the possibility of
a decrease in asset prices (i.e., the anticipation of a ﬁre sale) in the future
incentivizes banks to hoard cash instead of extending new loans. Bebchuk
and Goldstein’s [2011] explanation of freezes relies on coordination failure.
In their model, a bank’s payoﬀ from lending increases as other banks lend.
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An ineﬃcient freeze occurs because of the self-fulﬁlling expectations that
other banks will not be lending. Their result stems from complementarity
(i.e., a bank’s incentive to keep cash increases as others keep cash) whereas
my result is drawn from substitutability (i.e., a bank’s incentive to sell assets
decreases as others sell).
In perhaps the most closely related article, Gale and Yorulmazer [2013] study
freezes in the interbank market. In their model, cash is demanded both for
precautionary and speculative reasons: it helps banks satisfy their own needs
when a liquidity shock hits, and at the same time allows them to make proﬁt
by providing liquidity to other banks hit by the shock. In their model, a bank
provides a positive externality on other banks by keeping cash (i.e., the price
of cash goes down if the number of banks keeping cash goes up) whereas in
my model a bank imposes a negative externality on others by demanding
cash (i.e., the price of cash goes up if the number of banks demanding cash
goes up). Moreover, it is crucial for their results that the liquidity shock hits
in three periods. There would not be any ineﬃciency in their model if the
shock hit in only one (or two) period(s) as in my model.
My paper also contributes to the literature on bank competition. This lit-
erature can be divided into two camps: studies that ﬁnd bank competition
beneﬁcial for welfare, and those that do not.16 My paper falls into the sec-
ond camp. My results suggest that a concentrated banking system improves
welfare by reducing the ineﬃcient demand for liquidity.
16For example, Jayaratne and Strahan [1998], De Nicole [2000], and Boyd and De Nicole [2005]
argue that competition improves bank stability whereas Keeley [1990], Repullo [2004], and Beck,
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine [2006] suggest that it promotes bank failures.
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3.2 A Model of Perfect Competition
3.2.1 Environment
The model has three dates: t ∈ {1, 2, 3}. There is a continuum of ﬁnanciers
and a continuum of bankers. I represent the sets of each type of agents by the
unit interval [0, 1], where each point in the interval denotes a diﬀerent agent.
I measure the fraction of agents in any subset by its Lebesgue measure. The
assumption of a large number of individually insigniﬁcant (i.e., atomistic)
bankers ensures that none has enough market power to aﬀect the terms of
trade in the economy. I will change the perfectly competitive market set-up
later in Section 4 and introduce a monopolist with a competitive fringe. I
dispense with ﬁnancial discounting to avoid notational clutter.
Financiers are endowed with W units of a single good which can be used for
consumption and investment. I refer to it as cash and count it in dollars.
They are risk-neutral and they consume at date t = 3. Financiers have access
to the following production technology: x dollars invested at date t = 1 yield
f(x) dollars at date t = 3. f(·) satisﬁes the usual neoclassical properties:
f ′(·) > 0, f ′′(·) < 0, and f(0) = 0. I further assume that the third derivate
of the production function is positive. This assumption is innocent and does
not aﬀect my results (see footnote 8). Moreover, commonly used production
functions, such as Cobb-Douglas, satisfy this condition.
Investments in the production technology are fully reversible. That is, a
ﬁnancier can liquidate some part of his investment (without any cost) and
obtain his cash back. For example, if a ﬁnancier invests one dollar at date
t = 1 and removes 0.2 dollars from production at date t = 2, he would
receive 0.2+ f(0.8) dollars at date t = 3. I assume that absent an additional
incentive, liquidation is never eﬃcient. That is, f ′(W ) > 1. I refer to
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investments in this production technology as real assets.
Bankers own ﬁnancial assets which are worth r˜ at date t = 3. r˜ is a random
variable with E[r˜] = r and its exact distribution is not important. Financial
assets can be interpreted as a pool of many small projects such as a loan
portfolio. Bankers are ﬁnanced with deposits of face value d0 and they are
solvent in the long term: d0 < r.17
To simplify the exposition of welfare calculations, I assume that deposit
contracts are owned by ﬁnanciers. It would be possible to include an ini-
tial stage (i.e., date t = 0) to the model, at which bankers collect deposits
from ﬁnanciers and lend to another type of agents (i.e., entrepreneurs). I
abstract away from this additional layer to focus on the eﬀect of liquidity
management on welfare. Similar results could also be obtained by introduc-
ing entrepreneurs and by assuming that they can pledge outputs of their
projects to banks without any cost.
Bankers’ investments in ﬁnancial assets are not reversible. Bankers cannot
liquidate their projects before date t = 3 to obtain cash. To ensure that
bankers are able to sell their assets to ﬁnanciers (if needed), I assume that
the return on bankers’ assets is higher than the return on the ﬁnancier’s
production. In particular, I assume that r is greater than f ′(0). This as-
sumption is suﬃcient but not necessary for the results. Bankers consume at
date 3.
There also exists a simple storage technology available to both ﬁnanciers and
bankers. It allows agents to transfer their consumption goods (i.e., their
cash) to the next period without any loss or gain. Because ﬁnanciers can
liquidate their investments at no cost, they would never invest in the storage
17Bankers’ proﬁts in this competitive market can be justiﬁed by introducing a free-entry
condition which allows ﬁnanciers to become bankers at some cost, and by setting this entry cost
equal to bankers’ equilibrium proﬁts.
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technology. As it will be clear, the storage technology might be employed by
bankers at date t = 1 to keep cash against a possible liquidity shock at date
t = 2.
If I closed the model at this point, ﬁnanciers would invest all their endow-
ments and both types of agents would wait until date t = 3 to consume the
total output in the economy. Welfare, deﬁned as the total consumption at
date t = 3, could be calculated as follows:
Welfare = r − d0︸ ︷︷ ︸
bankers’ consumption
+ d0 + f(W )︸ ︷︷ ︸
ﬁnanciers’ consumption
= r + f(W ).
Now I include the possibility of a liquidity shock into the model. One way
of obtaining a need for liquidity is to introduce uncertainty in the time pref-
erences of depositors (i.e., ﬁnanciers). For example, many banking models
include impatient individuals who, with a positive probability, would like
to consume early (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig [1983] and Allen and Gale
[2000]). In those models the demand for liquidity by impatient depositors
promts the liquidation of illiquid assets. In this paper, to create a need for
liquidity, I will assume that bankers, with an exogenously given probability,
need additional ﬁnancing at an interim stage. Additional ﬁnancing might be
interpreted as an unexpected need of cash to cover the operating expenses of
the current investments. Such a structure has been employed in some other
banking models such as Holmstrom and Tirole [1998]. My results would not
change if I introduced uncertainty in the time preferences of depositors as in
Diamond and Dybvig [1983].
At date t = 2, with probability p ∈ [0, 1], bankers face a common liquidity
shock. In particular, some of their investments require additional ﬁnancing
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and each banker needs to invest an additional λ dollars if the liquidity shock
hits. Otherwise (i.e., if this additional amount is not paid), his investment
yields nothing. I assume that λ is smaller than W . This assumption ensures
that there is enough cash in the economy when the liquidity shock hits so
that bankers can raise funds from ﬁnanciers to be able to continue ﬁnancing
their projects. I also assume that sinking λ dollars when the liquidity shock
hits has a positive NPV. Since bankers need to oﬀer the return f ′(W − λ)
to get λ dollars from ﬁnanciers, this assumption can be stated as
λf ′(W − λ) < r − d0.
The left-hand side of the expression above represents bankers’ cost of raising
λ dollars from ﬁnanciers. The right-hand side is bankers’ (gross) proﬁt if they
raise λ dollars and sink into their investments when the liquidity shock hits.
Observe that investments in real assets decrease from f(W ) to f(W − λ) as
a result of the liquidity shock. That is, a liquidity shock causes an economic
crisis by reducing output.
I also introduce a government and allow it to intervene by providing liquidity
when a shock hits. I assume that it is costly for the government to provide
liquidity, perhaps, because in that case it has to divert funds from public
projects. The net per dollar cost of the government’s intervention on the
economy is ψ. For example, if the government provides λ dollars to bankers
at date t = 2, the welfare loss would be λψ whereas it would have been
f(W )− f(W −λ) if ﬁnanciers had provided λ dollars. ψ can be high or low:
ψ ∈ {ψl, ψh} with ψl < f ′(W ) and ψh > f ′(W −λ). The ex ante probability
that ψ is equal to ψh is q ∈ [0, 1].
The government acts as a social planner and intervenes (i.e., provides liquid-
ity) only if its intervention is eﬃcient for the economy (i.e., when ψ is equal
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to ψl). When it intervenes, it sets the price of the liquidity (e.g., interest
rate) and bankers choose to obtain cash either from the government or ﬁ-
nanciers. When the welfare eﬀects of several pricing strategies are the same,
the government chooses the strategy that maximizes its payoﬀ. Finally, for
simplicity, I do not allow partial intervention. That is, if the liquidity shock
hits at date t = 2, either the government or ﬁnanciers provide the liquidity,
not both.
3.2.2 Competitive Banker’s Problem
At date t = 1, depending on the magnitude of p, bankers might want to keep
some cash. Bankers can obtain cash by selling their assets to ﬁnanciers.18
Alternatively, they can wait until date t = 2 and sell their assets only if the
liquidity shock hits. As it will be clear, the reason bankers want to obtain
some cash at date t = 1 is that it will be more costly to obtain cash at date
t = 2 if the liquidity shock hits.
Let C1 be the amount of cash bankers demand at date t = 1. In order to
obtain C1 dollars, they sell the fraction μ1 of their assets. Because ﬁnanciers
have an opportunity to invest in their production technology, bankers have
to oﬀer a discount to convince ﬁnanciers to buy their ﬁnancial assets at date
t = 1. Let d1 be the (gross) return ﬁnanciers receive at date t = 3 when
they buy bankers’ assets at date t = 1. The following equality holds when
the market clears:
C1d1 = rμ1.
18A banker can also raise funds in other forms, for instance by collecting deposits. My results
would not change if the banker obtained cash by issuing new debt contracts. In general, because
the new debt will be subordinated relative to the existing debt, such a form of ﬁnancing will not
be possible because of the debt overhang problem. See Stein [2012] for an explanation why an
asset sale is an unavoidable consequence of a liquidity shock.
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To obtain C1 dollars from ﬁnanciers, bankers sell their assets worth rμ1
dollars. Bankers cannot sell their assets without oﬀering a discount (i.e., 1
d1
)
because the marginal return of ﬁnanciers’ production technology is greater
than one.
Bankers’ decision at date t = 2 is trivial: if the liquidity shock does not
hit, they do not take any action. In that case, their proﬁt at date t = 3
becomes (1 − μ1)r + C1 − d0. Otherwise (i.e., if the shock hits at date
t = 2), each banker sells fraction μ2 of their assets to obtain C2 = λ − C1
dollars.19 If the government’s cost of intervention is too high, ﬁnanciers buy
bankers’ assets. For ﬁnanciers to be willing to liquidate their investments
to pay λ − C1 dollars to bankers, the marginal return of their remaining
investments should be equal to the return they obtain from ﬁnancial assets.
The following equation pins down the return of the assets sold to ﬁnanciers
in the ﬁre sale at date t = 2:
d2 = f
′(W − C1 − C2)
= f ′(W − λ).
(19)
Thus, the price of bankers’ assets at date t = 2 is 1
f ′(W−λ) . Note that the
government, when it intervenes, buys bankers’ assets at the same price. To
see that, ﬁrst observe that the price cannot be lower than 1
f ′(W−λ) ; otherwise
bankers would prefer obtaining cash from ﬁnanciers instead of the govern-
ment. The price cannot be higher than 1
f ′(W−λ) either because in that case
the government could increase its payoﬀ, without aﬀecting welfare, by re-
ducing price to 1
f ′(W−λ) . Therefore, regardless of who the provider of the
liquidity is, d2, the return from the ﬁre sale at date t = 2, would be the
same.
19I deﬁne μ2 as the ratio of the value of assets sold at date t = 2 to r. Note also that it is not
optimal to obtain more than λ dollars at any date.
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Now I can derive the return of the assets sold at date t = 1 (i.e., d1). At
date t = 1, a ﬁnancier should be indiﬀerent between buying the banker’s
assets with his last penny and investing in his production technology. With
probability 1−p+p(1−q) = 1−pq, the ﬁnancier will not provide additional
ﬁnancing to the banker at date t = 2. It could be either because the liquidity
shock does not hit or the liquidity shock hits but the government intervenes.
In both cases, the marginal return of the ﬁnancier’s investment is f ′(W−C1).
With the complementary probability pq, the ﬁnancier provides additional
ﬁnancing and earns d2 on each dollar he gives to the banker at date t = 2.
The indiﬀerence condition gives
d1 = (1− pq)f ′(W − C1) + pqf ′(W − λ). (20)
The ineﬃciency of a ﬁre sale is evident from the expression above. A ﬁre sale
at date t = 1 reduces investments in real assets from f(W ) to f(W − C1),
which is ineﬃcient in expectation because there is a possibility that the
liquidity shock will not hit.
Bankers’ expected proﬁt at date t = 1 is
(1− p)
[
(1− μ1)r + C1 − d0
]
+ p
[
(1− μ1 − μ2)r − d0
]
,
which on substituting for μ1 = C1d1r and μ2 =
(λ−C1)d2
r
simpliﬁes to
r − d0 − pλd2 +ΔC1,
where I deﬁne
Δ := 1− p− d1 + pd2. (21)
Observe that bankers’ proﬁt function is linear in C1. Therefore, the amount
of cash demanded at date t = 1 depends on Δ, the coeﬃcient of C1. For
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example, if Δ is negative, none of the bankers will demand cash. Also observe
that each competitive banker takes Δ as given. That is, an individual banker
has no power to aﬀect d1 or d2, and thus Δ. The following lemma uses these
observations to derive the equilibrium. The proofs of the lemmas are in the
Appendix.
Lemma 1. Deﬁne p1 = f
′(W )−1
qf ′(W )+(1−q)f ′(W−λ)−1 . If the probability of the liq-
uidity shock is smaller than p1, bankers do not demand cash at date t = 1.
Otherwise, bankers’ total demand for cash, C1, at date t = 1 can be calculated
from the equation below:
f ′(W − C1) = 1
1− pq
[
1− p+ p(1− q)f ′(W − λ)
]
.
Bankers in a competitive market have an incentive to obtain some cash at
date t = 1 against the potential liquidity shock at date t = 2. They demand
cash because if a liquidity shock hits, their cost of obtaining cash will be
higher: f ′(W − C1) < f ′(W − λ). Their rush to raise funds at date t = 1,
before a liquidity shock hits, causes misallocation of funds in the economy by
reducing investments in real assets. Welfare in the economy is given below:
r+(1−p)
[
f(W−C1)+C1
]
+p
[
qf(W−λ)+(1−q)(f(W−C1)−ψl(λ−C1))
]
,
(22)
where C1 can be obtained from Lemma 1. The analysis so far is summarized
in the proposition below and illustrated in Figure 1.
Proposition 1. Competitive bankers’ demand for cash at date t = 1 in-
creases with the probability of the liquidity shock.
Proof. Competitive bankers’ demand for cash at date t = 1 is zero when the
probability of the liquidity shock is smaller than p1. When this probability
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Figure 2: Competitive bankers’ demand for cash at date t = 1 increases with the
probability of the liquidity shock.
is greater than p1, the ﬁrst-order condition of the bankers’ problem requires
Δ to be zero. The partial derivative of C1 with respect to p at the optimum
can be obtained by applying the implicit function theorem to the ﬁrst-order
condition:
∂C1
∂p
= −(1− q)
(
f ′(W − λ)− 1)
(1− pq)2f ′′(W − C1) .
Because the expression above is positive, bankers’ demand for cash increases
with the likelihood of the liquidity shock.
With his demand at date t = 1, a banker contributes to the increase in
the price of cash. That is, each banker imposes a negative externality on
other bankers. One might ask why this externality is not corrected by the
price system. After all, pecuniary externalities do not result in misallocation
of resources.20 A pecuniary externality causes an ineﬃciency in my model
because the government cannot commit not to provide liquidity. In particu-
lar, the government cannot commit at date t = 1 not to intervene when its
20See, for example, Shubik [1971] and Laﬀont [1987] for explanations why pecuniary external-
ities do not lead to violations of the standard welfare theorems.
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intervention is beneﬁcial for the economy at date t = 2.
To see why the possibility of a government intervention creates ineﬃciency,
assume that the probability of government intervention is zero in the model.
Observe that when 1− q is zero, bankers do not demand cash at date t = 1
because the threshold p1 in Lemma 1 becomes one. Intuitively, the possi-
bility of the government intervention at date t = 2 softens bankers’ budget
constraint at date t = 1 by preventing the ﬁre-sale price to fall too much.
In particular, when government intervention is not a possibility, the buyers
of ﬁnancial assets at date t = 1 demand a higher discount in the ﬁre sale
because they know that if the liquidity shock hits they will make a higher
proﬁt with their cash in hand. The subsequent increase in the ﬁre-sale price
deters bankers from selling their assets at date t = 1, and the ineﬃciency
disappears.
3.3 Social Planner’s Problem
The social planner’s objective function at date t = 1 is given below:
(1−p)
[
r+f(W−C1)+C1
]
+p
[
r+qf(W−λ)+(1−q)(f(W−C1)−(λ−C1)ψl)
]
.
The ﬁrst part represents the output in the economy if the liquidity shock
does not hit. The second part corresponds to the output if the shock hits.
In the latter case the social planner also recognizes the loss in welfare due to
the government’s intervention. Asset sales and interest payments are trans-
fers between agents and, thus, they do not show up in the social planner’s
objective function. The social planner cares only about the total produc-
tion in the economy. The following proposition derives the social planner’s
strategy.
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Proposition 2. The social planner does not sell any of the banker’s assets
at date t = 1.
Proof. The partial derivative of the objective function with respect to C1 is
negative:
(1− p)(− f ′(W − C1) + 1)+ p(1− q)(− f ′(W − C1) + ψl) < 0.
Thus the objective function is maximized by setting C1 to zero.
The intuition behind this result is clear: the sale of the ﬁnancial assets at
date t = 1 reduces the investment in the real assets, which will be ineﬃcient
if the liquidity shock does not hit. The welfare under the social planner’s
management can be written as
r + (1− p)f(W ) + pqf(W − λ) + p(1− q)(f(W )− λψl). (23)
The loss in welfare (due to the rush to obtain liquidity) in the perfectly
competitive market can be calculated by subtracting (5) from (4):
(1−p)
[
f(W )−f(W−C1)−C1
]
+p
[
(1−q)(f(W )−f(W−C1)+C1ψl)
]
. (24)
For small values of p, competition does not result in any output loss. In
particular, when the probability of the liquidity shock is smaller than p1,
bankers do not sell any asset at date t = 1 (i.e., C1 = 0) and the expression
(24) becomes zero. When the probability of the shock is greater than p1,
bankers would like to sell their assets before others do (i.e., C1 > 0). Such
a rush for liquidity adversely aﬀects the output by prompting ﬁnanciers to
reduce their investments in real assets even before the liquidity shock hits.
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3.4 Monopolist with a Competitive Fringe
The analysis in the previous sections shows that populating the economy with
many small banks causes a welfare loss. The main reason for this ineﬃciency
is that small banks do not recognize their own impact on the equilibrium
terms of trade (i.e., ﬁre-sale prices at date t = 1). Their individually optimal
decisions become suboptimal from the social planner’s perspective. In this
section I introduce into the model one big bank which internalizes its impact
on the prices. In particular, I assume that some bankers with the total
measure of φ > 0 merge and establish one big bank. The rest of the banking
system consists of many small bankers which, in aggregate, occupy 1− φ of
the banking system.
I will denote the big bank and the small competitive bankers with super-
scripts "b" and "s" respectively. The total demand for cash in the economy
at date t = 1 is the sum of demands of both types of bankers:
C1 = φC
b
1 + (1− φ)Cs1 .
Fire-sale prices at dates t = 1 and t = 2 can be obtained from (19) and (20).
The big bank’s expected proﬁt at date t = 1 is
(1− p)
[
(1− μb1)r + Cb1 − d0
]
+ p
[
(1− μb1 − μb2)r − d0
]
,
which on substituting for μb1 =
Cb1d1
r
and μb2 =
(λ−Cb1)d2
r
simpliﬁes to
r − d0 − pλd2 +ΔCb1.
Contrary to small bankers’ objective, the big bank’s objective function is not
linear in its demand for cash (i.e., in Cb1) because d1 in Δ depends on Cb1.
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That is, by demanding cash the big bank aﬀects the ﬁre-sale price at date
t = 1. The partial derivative of the big bank’s proﬁt function with respect
to Cb1 gives
Δ+ φCb1f
′′(W − φCb1 + (1− φ)Cs1).
The second term above represents the big bank’s own inﬂuence on the ﬁre-
sale price at date t = 1. Because f ′′(·) is negative, the big bank has less
incentive to sell its assets compared to small bankers which take the ﬁre-sale
price as given.21 The following lemma derives the equilibrium at date t = 1.
Lemma 2. Deﬁne p1 = f
′(W )−1
qf ′(W )+(1−q)f ′(W−λ)−1 and
p2 =
f ′(W )−1
qf ′(W )+(1−q)f ′
(
W−(1−φ)λ
)
−1
.
The equilibrium at date t = 1 can be characterized by three regions:
• p ∈ [0, p1): There is no demand for cash and, thus, no ﬁre sale.
• p ∈ [p1, p2): Small bankers demand some cash, but the big bank does
not. The total demand for cash in the economy, C1 = (1 − φ)Cs, can
be computed from the expression below:
f ′
(
W − C1
)
=
1
1− pq
[
1 + p+ (1− q)f ′(W − λ)
]
.
• p ∈ (p2, 1]: Each small banker demands λ dollars while the big bank
demands Cb1 dollars. The total demand for cash in the economy, C1 =
φCb + (1− φ)λ, can be computed from the expression below:
f ′(W−C1) = 1
1− pq
[
1+p+(1−q)f ′(W−λ)
]
+
C1 − (1− φ)λ
1− pq f
′′(W−C1).
(25)
21Note that the second-order condition of the maximization problem is satisﬁed because the
third derivative of the production function is positive. If the third derivative were negative, the
big bank would demand even less cash. For example, in the extreme, if the third derivative were
negative inﬁnity, the big bank would not demand any cash at all.
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Figure 3: The black curve shows the aggregate demand for cash in the monopolistic
banking structure with a competitive fringe. The red dashed curve represents the
demand for cash in the competitive market.
Note that the upper threshold p2 approaches p1 as φ decreases. When the
market becomes perfectly competitive (i.e., φ = 0), Lemma 2 is equivalent
to Lemma 1.
When the probability of the liquidity shock is between p1 and p2, the total
demand for cash in the economy is the same in both market structures.
Although the big bank does not sell its assets, each small banker sells more
than the amount they would sell in a perfectly competitive market. When
the probability of a shock is greater than p2, the total demand for cash is
higher in the competitive market because the last term in expression (25) is
negative. The following proposition summarizes the analysis and Figure 2
illustrates the result by comparing the demand for cash in the two market
structures.
Proposition 3. Introduction of a big bank into a perfectly competitive mar-
ket improves eﬃciency by reducing the demand for cash in the economy at
date t = 1.
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Proof. The welfare loss can be calculated by inserting the total demand for
cash C1 into expression (24). The partial derivative of (24) with respect to
C1 is
(1− p)[f ′(W − C1)− 1]+ p(1− q)[f ′(W − C1) + ψl],
which is positive. A decrease in the total demand for cash at date t = 1
increases welfare.
3.5 Conclusion
Big banks tend to take excessive risks, because they expect to receive as-
sistance from the government if their bets go bad. The possibility of a
government bailout weakens the market discipline by reducing depositors’
incentives to monitor.
In this paper, I identify a market failure and argue that big banks are helpful
in correcting this failure. In particular, I show that when faced with the
possibility of a liquidity shock, competitive banks cause a decline in the
output by removing funds from the real assets through a ﬁre sale. They have
an additional incentive to trigger a ﬁre sale because they do not internalize
their own impact on prices.
Big banks can improve welfare. They play the role of a moderator in ﬁre
sales because they internalize the eﬀect of their own actions. Their timely
sales improve eﬃciency by decreasing the amount of funds removed from the
real assets. These results suggest that instead of blindly penalizing banks
for being too big, regulators should balance the beneﬁts and costs of having
big banks.
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3.6 Appendix
This appendix contains the proofs of the lemmas.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The representative competitive banker’s problem is given below:
max
C1
r − d0 − pλd2 +ΔC1,
where
d1 = (1− pq)f ′(W − C1) + pqf ′(W − λ)
d2 = f
′(W − λ)
Δ = 1− p− d1 + pd2.
The objective function is linear in C1. Therefore, each banker’s demand
for cash at date t = 1 depends on the sign of Δ. There are three cases to
consider:
• Δ < 0. In this case, none of the bankers demands any cash before a
liquidity shock hits. They set C1 = 0. The return on assets sold in the
ﬁre sale at date t = 1 becomes
d1 = (1− pq)f ′(W − λ) + qf ′(W ).
The condition Δ < 0 can be written as
p <
f ′(W )− 1
qf ′(W ) + (1− q)f ′(W − λ)− 1 .
The expression on the right-hand side of the inequality above deﬁnes
p1, the threshold probability that bankers start selling their assets.
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• Δ = 0. In this case, at date t = 1 each banker is indiﬀerent between
obtaining some cash and not. In the symmetrical equilibrium each
banker demands the same amount of cash C1, which can be calculated
from the equation below:
Δ = 0 ⇔ f ′(W − C1) = 1
1− pq
[
1− p+ p(1− q)f ′(W − λ)
]
.
Note that because C1 ∈ [0, λ], this equilibrium is possible only if p ≥ p1.
• Δ > 0. In this case, each bank demands C1 = λ, the maximum amount
of cash they will need if a liquidity shock hits. The returns on assets
bought in the ﬁre sales at date t = 1 and t = 2 (i.e., d1 and d2) become
equal:
d1 = d2 = f
′(W − λ).
If at date t = 1 a banker knows that the cost of obtaining cash will be
the same at date t = 2, he optimally postpones his selling decision. By
postponing he can be sure that he obtains cash only when he needs it.
Therefore, bankers will not sell any of their assets at date t = 1 if d1 is
equal to d2. This contradicts with the claim that Δ is positive in the
equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The representative small banker’s problem is given below:
max
Cb1
r − d0 − pλd2 +ΔCb1,
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where
d1 = (1− pq)f ′(W − φCb1 − (1− φ)Cs1) + pqf ′(W − λ)
d2 = f
′(W − λ)
Δ = 1− p− d1 + pd2.
As in the competitive market, the small banker’s problem is linear in his
demand for cash (i.e., Cb1). That is, small bankers base their decisions on
the sign of Δ. The big bank’s proﬁt function is given below:
r − d0 − pλd2 +ΔCb1.
The partial derivative of the big bank’s proﬁt function with respect to Cb1
gives
Δ− φCb1f ′′
(
W − φCb1 − (1− φ)Cs1
)
, (26)
which is not linear. Observe that because f ′′(·) is negative, the big bank’s
incentive to obtain cash is smaller than that of the small banker. I use the
same technique I invoke in the proof of Lemma 1 and derive the equilibrium
considering the three diﬀerent cases with respect to Δ.
• Δ < 0. In this case, none of the bankers demands cash. They set
Cb1 = C
s
1 = 0. The return on the assets sold in the ﬁre sale at date
t = 1 becomes
d1 = (1− pq)f ′(W − λ) + qf ′(W ).
The condition Δ < 0 can be written as
p <
f ′(W )− 1
qf ′(W ) + (1− q)f ′(W − λ)− 1 .
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As in Lemma 1, the expression on the right-hand side of the inequality
above deﬁnes p1, the threshold probability that bankers start selling
their assets.
• Δ = 0. In this case, at date t = 1 each small banker is indiﬀerent
between obtaining some cash and not. The big bank does not demand
any cash (i.e., Cb1 = 0). In the symmetrical equilibrium each small
banker demands the same amount of cash Cs1 . The total demand for
cash in the economy becomes C1 = (1− φ)Cs1 , which can be calculated
from the equation below:
Δ = 0 ⇔ f ′(W − C1) = 1
1− pq
[
1− p+ p(1− q)f ′(W − λ)
]
.
Applying the implicit function theorem to the expression above yields:
∂C1
∂p
= − (1− q)
(
f ′(W − λ)− 1)
(1− φ)(1− pq)2f ′′(W − C1) ,
which is positive. That is, as p increases, small bankers’ demand for
cash increases. When their demand reaches λ dollars (i.e., when they
are fully insured at date t = 1 against a liquidity shock), Δ becomes
positive. This observation determines p2, the upper threshold of the
interval in which such an equilibrium is possible:
p2 =
f ′(W )− 1
qf ′(W ) + (1− q)f ′(W − (1− φ)λ)− 1 .
• Δ > 0. In this case, small bankers demand Cs1 = λ, the entire amount
of cash they will need at date t = 2 if a liquidity shock hits. The big
bank also demands some cash: to satisfy the ﬁrst-order condition (i.e.,
to set the expression (26) to zero), Cb must be positive. The ﬁrst-order
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condition yields
(1− pq)f ′(W − φCb − (1− φ)λ)− φCb1f ′′(W − φCb1 − (1− φ)λ)
= 1− p+ (1− q)f ′(W − λ)
or
f ′(W−C1) = 1
1− pq
[
1+p+(1−q)f ′(W−λ)
]
+
C1 − (1− φ)λ
1− pq f
′′(W−C1),
where C1 = φCb+(1−φ)λ is the total demand for cash in the economy.
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Essay 3
Compromising Welfare
Abstract
The U.S. Constitution includes many checks and balances that necessitate
the ruling party to compromise with the opposition. I develop a model in
which this feature prompts the President to compromise on the strength of the
candidates nominated for positions in the federal government and judiciary.
I test the model by using data of the nominations of federal judges from
1989 to 2014. Because federal judges are appointed for life, appointments of
competent younger judges extend the productive period they spend on the
bench and improve welfare. Consistent with the predictions of the model,
and controlling for each candidate’s competence with the rating assigned by
the American Bar Association, I ﬁnd that the conﬁrmation in the Senate is
more likely and faster when the President compromises on the strength of
the candidate by nominating an older individual. These ﬁndings suggest that
the system of checks and balances comes with a price.
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Parties might settle while leaving justice undone.
– Owen Fiss (1984)
4.1 Introduction
Compromises are considered as socially desirable means to reach an agree-
ment. The general notion among scholars and in the public is that political
parties should be ready to make sacriﬁces to settle disputes at times when
disagreements and inability to reach consensus block negotiations (e.g., Gut-
mann and Thompson [2014], Sollenberger [2008], and Smith [1942]). For
example, the Founding Fathers had to compromise on numerous issues to be
able to agree on a constitution that was acceptable to every state.22
Although compromises reduce delays in negotiations and might even be nec-
essary to end a dispute, they might also lead to ineﬃcient outcomes for
society. Consider an economic policy—an alternative to the status quo—
expected to promote stability in the next period. For the policy to be
adopted, it has to be approved by both parties in the Senate. Although
both parties beneﬁt from the policy, it might not be approved if it is also
redistributive (i.e., if the policy also implies a political transfer from the mi-
nority party to the majority party). In particular, if the transfer is greater
than the beneﬁt the minority party obtains from the policy, the majority
party needs to compromise to pass the proposal. The outcome might be a
policy close to the status quo.
22Discussions on the representation in Congress led to establishment of two chambers: the
Senate where each state is equally represented and the House of Representatives where states
are represented based on population. The election procedure of the President and the rules on
slavery were also agreed upon compromises (Marshall [1987]).
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To show how political dynamics force parties to agree on a suboptimal so-
lution, I construct a two-party bargaining model with one side making the
oﬀer. Parties are heterogeneous in their objectives as in Alesina [1987]. In
particular, once elected, each party aims to appoint a strong individual to a
governmental post. Since nominators and nominees tend to share the same
policy preferences, an appointment of a stronger candidate also means a
larger transfer between the parties. As a result a strong candidate meets
greater resistance, which creates an ineﬃcient delay in reaching an agree-
ment. In the equilibrium, the parties agree on a compromised solution, and
appoint a weaker candidate than is socially optimal. If parties could com-
mit to their future actions, they would agree on a cooperative rule and the
ineﬃciency arising from a compromise would be avoided. Thus, the model
provides an argument in favor of rules rather than discretion.
Dixit, Grossman, and Gul [2000] analyze the dynamics of political compro-
mise. In their model the ruling party is willing to compromise because it
believes that its successor will do the same. They show that such a tacit
cooperation (i.e., making a compromise once elected) can be sustained as an
eﬃcient equilibrium. In a one-period version of their model, a compromise
would not occur although it is socially desirable. In my model, on the other
hand, compromise is not socially desirable, yet it arises as an outcome of the
game.
It is not easy to test the predictions of my model because the econometrician
generally cannot foresee the welfare implications of a compromise. When
two parties debate on a policy proposal, it is hard to distinguish whether the
debate is really on welfare or on the political transfer between the parties.
For example, Republicans might support a tax cut to stimulate the economy
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or attract new voters. Likewise, Democrats might want to increase social
security beneﬁts to induce poor voters to vote or because they believe it is
good for the welfare of the nation. To test the implications of the model,
therefore, we need an environment where the eﬀect of a compromise on
welfare is suﬃciently clear.
Appointments to judiciary provide such an environment. Recently, a great
deal of attention in the media has been devoted to delays in Senate conﬁr-
mations to President Obama’s nominations to federal courts.23 At the same
time, less attention has been paid to the welfare implications of such delays.
When the bench stays empty, dockets accumulate and justice slows down.
The delay also has an indirect negative eﬀect: a possible threat to block
a nomination prompts the President to choose a candidate who is likely to
be approved faster by the Senate. In other words, political dynamics might
force the President to compromise on the strength of the nominee.
Appointing a strong candidate is desirable from the social planner’s per-
spective. A strong candidate—energetic and quick to adapt to new
environments—is likely to be more productive. Because these attributes are
unobservable, I use the age of the nominee as a measure of her strength.24
To see why age is a good proxy for the strength of the nominee, consider a
situation where a life-time position has to be ﬁlled for the next one hundred
years and life expectancy is 80 years. Compare the following two strategies:
(i) appoint a 65-year-old and replace her with another 65-year-old every 15
years. (ii) Appoint a 50-year-old and replace her with another person of the
same age every 30 years. There are several reasons why the second strategy
23See, for example, recent articles in Bloomberg [2014], Economist [2013], New Yorker [2014],
and Wall Street Journal [2013].
24In addition to energy and adaptability, strength also captures other (more easily observable)
decision-making qualities of the candidate, such as education and experience. In the empirical
analysis, I control for these attributes with the rating assigned by the American Bar Association.
65
generates greater welfare.
First, spending a longer time at the same position helps an individual develop
the skills necessary to master his job.25 According to John Paul Stevens, the
second-longest-serving judge on the U.S. Supreme Court, learning on the
job is essential to the process of judging. In his talk at a forum in his honor
(Stevens [2006]), he provides several examples from his life showing how
a federal judge improves his decisions over the years while serving on the
bench.
Second, the life-cycle hypothesis of human productivity (see, for instance,
Levin and Stephan [1991]) asserts that individuals become less productive
as they age. Several pieces of evidence from the judiciary support this hy-
pothesis. Older judges write fewer separate opinions (Buchman [2010]) and
receive fewer citations (Posner [1995] and Bhattacharya and Smyth [2001]).
Moreover, there are numerous examples of how mental decline and incapac-
ity have troubled U.S. federal courts. William Douglas, the longest-serving
judge on the Supreme Court, barely functioned in his last year in 1975, mak-
ing the other eight judges of the Supreme Court agree to nullify any decision
in which Douglas cast the deciding vote. Stephen Field, the third-longest-
serving judge on the Supreme Court, became feeble after serving 27 years
on the bench and lost conception of the arguments that were made before
him. Garrow [2000] covers other instances that question whether judicial
votes were cast by a less than fully competent justice.
Third, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that federal judges delay their
retirements strategically to prevent the appointment of a person with a diﬀer-
ent ideological view. The anti-Roosevelt Justice James McReynolds famously
25In his most cited paper, Arrow [1962] ascribes the improvement in the quality of the labor
force over time to learning by doing. See Thompson [2010] for a review of the learning by doing
literature.
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said "I’ll never resign as long as that crippled son-of-a-bitch is in the White
House" (Shesol [2010]). Chief Justice William Rehnquist, a conservative Re-
publican, was reluctant to retire as long as President Clinton remained in the
White House (Epstein and Segal [2005]).26 Such strategic behavior inﬂates
the negative consequences of appointments of older candidates. Revisit the
previous example. If a 65-year-old person is appointed every time the seat is
vacant, over one hundred years, more people will be occupying the seat who
would retire (say, because of poor health) absent such strategic behavior.
I use the data of the appointments of U.S. federal judges from 1989 to 2014
to test the implications of my model. First, I show that the nomination
is more likely to be conﬁrmed by the Senate if the President compromises
on the strength of the candidate (i.e., when the candidate is older). Next,
I analyze the number of days an appointment waits in the Senate. I ﬁnd
that stronger nominees wait longer for conﬁrmation. Moreover, the delay is
longer when the redistributive eﬀect of an appointment is greater, i.e., when
the parties have more divergent opinions on policy.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. The next section introduces
a model of political bargaining on the appointments to the federal govern-
ment. Comparative statics of the equilibrium produces three empirically
testable predictions which I test in Section 3 using data from federal judge
appointments. The empirical results are consistent with the predictions of
the model. The last section concludes.
4.2 Model
To show how political dynamics leads to a socially ineﬃcient outcome, I
consider a one-sided bargaining game between the two parties in the U.S.
26See Ward [2003] for more examples.
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Senate. At the beginning of the game a coin ﬂip determines the winner of the
election. The winner (i.e., the ﬁrst player) represents the party of the Pres-
ident and the loser (i.e., the second player) represents the opposition party.
I assume that each senator’s interests completely align with the interests of
the other senators in the same party. Hence the game can be considered as
a bargaining game between two individuals. Time is discrete.
The game starts when the President nominates a candidate i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}
for a vacant seat in the federal government or judiciary. I use si ∈ R+ to
represent the strength of the candidate. Candidates are indexed according
to their strengths: s1 < s2 < ... < sN . I assume that candidate N is
strong enough to ensure that the interval of the candidates nominated in the
equilibrium is not an empty set. Otherwise the game ends without agreement
between the parties.27
Strength is publicly observable and reﬂects how inﬂuential the candidate will
be in making decisions. As it will be clear later, appointment of a stronger
candidate increases welfare and is thus preferable from the social planner’s
perspective.
The second player observes nominee i and decides whether to accept or reject
the nomination. Rejection can be interpreted as blocking the nomination in
the Senate. A common method of preventing the Senate from voting is to
extend the debate (i.e., to ﬁlibuster). In principle, each senator can ask for
permission to debate the proposal and can speak as long as he wants. The
threat of a ﬁlibuster often is suﬃcient to block the nomination.28 Another
method of causing delays is to demand a quorum call (i.e., to ask whether
27This assumption will be useful while deriving Proposition 1.
28Current rules allow a qualiﬁed majority (i.e., 60 out of 100 senators) to block a ﬁlibuster by
invoking cloture. However, the cloture attempt itself could be ﬁlibustered. In that case a more
qualiﬁed majority (i.e., 67 senators) is needed to end the debate.
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the majority is present, which is a constitutional requirement for the Senate
to conduct business). Usually the majority is not present and a quorum call
suspends the proceedings.
If the second player accepts the oﬀer, the game ends. In that case there is a
transfer from the second player to the ﬁrst.29 The size of the transfer depends
on the strength of the candidate and polarization π > 0 between the parties.
If appointed, the nominee not only serves the society, but also aﬀects the
decisions in favor of the ﬁrst party.30 Thus a stronger candidate increases the
transfer. Polarization also positively aﬀects the transfer; when the parties
have more divergent opinions on issues and when their attitudes are starkly
divided along partisan lines, an appointment generates a greater transfer. A
growing amount of empirical literature shows that the diﬀerences between
the two parties’ views on major policy issues are expanding in the Congress.31
I denote πsi to represent the size of the transfer from the second player to
the ﬁrst.32 In addition to the transfer, both parties receive si upon the
appointment of candidate i. Because a strong candidate is more productive,
she also contributes more to welfare. Moreover, if polarization is greater
than 1, the minority always receives a negative payoﬀ upon agreement.
29With this formulation I implicitly assume that the nominee has the same political ideology
as the President.
30There is no doubt that federal judges aﬀect American politics with their decisions. For
example, the Supreme Court—with the deciding votes of judges appointed by Republican pres-
idents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush—voted 5 against 4 to put a stop to the Florida
recount in the presidential election in 2000. This decision allowed George W. Bush to be the next
president. Many believe that the Court’s decision was political, not judicial (See, for example,
Dershowitz [2001] and Neumann [2003]).
31See Barber and McCarty [2013] and Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz [2006] for reviews of the
literature on polarization in U.S. politics.
32There are two approaches to modeling political systems. One approach follows Downs [1957]
and assumes that the sole aim of a party is to remain in oﬃce. This assumption leads parties
to converge to the ideological center. The second approach assumes that parties have diﬀerent
intrinsic preferences on diﬀerent policies (e.g., Alesina [1987]). My model follows the second
approach and thus precludes the convergence result.
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If the second player rejects the nomination, the ﬁrst player has to decide
whether to keep her oﬀer or to withdraw. If she keeps the oﬀer, both players
incur a normalized cost of 1 unit and the game moves to the next period.33
The cost can be interpreted as suﬀering from the lack of public service. In
the case of an appointment to the judiciary, this cost could be the delayed
dockets at courts.34 If the ﬁrst player withdraws, the game ends without
an agreement between the players. In that case their payoﬀ consists only
of delay costs. Ending the game absent an agreement, instead of giving the
ﬁrst player one more chance to make another oﬀer, simpliﬁes the analysis
and reﬂects the reality. If a federal judge was not conﬁrmed by the Senate,
the President, during the 1989 to 2014 period, was able to nominate someone
else for the position in only 37% of the cases.
There is a unique equilibrium if π ≤ 1. In this case the ﬁrst player oﬀers
sN and the second player accepts immediately. Because polarization is not
too high, the ﬁrst party does not need to compromise on the strength of the
candidate to convince the second. Appointment generates positive payoﬀs to
both parties. When polarization is high, however, the second player receives
a negative payoﬀ upon agreement. For the rest of the paper, I assume that
polarization is high (i.e., π > 1) so that the second player has an incentive
to keep the seat empty.
This game has two pure strategy equilibria where one player concedes imme-
diately and the other never quits. However, political dynamics in the Senate
do not allow any party to be the one who concedes immediately. For exam-
33The results of the model hold even if the players incur diﬀerent delay costs.
34In her interview, Laurel Bellows, the former President of the American Bar Association,
points out the economic consequences of delayed dockets at courts: "Our economy depends on
courts to enforce contracts, protect property, and determine liability. Judicial vacancies increase
caseloads per judge, creating delays that jeopardize the ability of courts to expeditiously deliver
judgments. Delay translates into costs for litigants. Delay results in uncertainty that discourages
growth and investment. ... vacancies are potential job-killers." (Hill [2013])
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ple, if election of party representatives was introduced as an initial stage of
the game, immediate concession would not be sustained in a subgame perfect
equilibrium because a candidate who commits to concede immediately would
not be elected in the ﬁrst place. The observed delays in reaching agreements
in the Senate conﬁrm this insight. Therefore, I focus on the mixed strategy
equilibrium where players concede with positive probabilities over time.
It is well known that in a war of attrition players concede at constant haz-
ard rates (see, for instance, Abreu and Gul [2001]). Deﬁne p and q as the
concession rates of the players. That is, in each period the ﬁrst player with-
draws the oﬀer with probability p and the second player accepts the oﬀer
with probability q. The indiﬀerence conditions of the players in each period
pin down p and q. The ﬁrst player is indiﬀerent between ending the game
by withdrawing the oﬀer and continuing the ﬁght by insisting on her oﬀer in
each period. That is,
0 = −1 + qsj(π + 1),
where j is the candidate nominated in equilibrium. Similarly, the second
player is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting the oﬀer:
−sj(π − 1) = (1− p)[−sj(π − 1)− 1].
I can then solve the equations above for p and q to obtain
p =
1
1 + sj(π − 1)
and
q =
1
sj(π + 1)
.
These equations have a number of useful properties which I summarize in
the following three propositions.
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Proposition 1. In equilibrium, the ﬁrst player is indiﬀerent between any
candidate j, where sj ≥ 1π+1 .
Proof. The payoﬀ of the ﬁrst player is positive and equals to qsj(π+1) = 1,
which does not depend on the oﬀer or polarization. Moreover, the oﬀer
cannot be too small. In particular, when si(π+1) is smaller than 1, the ﬁrst
player has no incentive to keep the oﬀer, because the per unit cost of delay
exceeds her maximum reward from staying in the game.
Intuitively, a strong candidate (i.e., a high sj) also meets higher resistance
from the second party. The cost of delay of the approval balances the beneﬁt
the ﬁrst party obtains from the appointment of a stronger candidate, which
makes the ﬁrst party indiﬀerent between diﬀerent candidates. While the ﬁrst
player’s expected payoﬀ (i.e. V1 = 1) is positive, the second player’s payoﬀ
(i.e., V2 = −sj(π − 1)) is negative and aﬀected by the oﬀer and the degree
of polarization. That is why the minority opposes conﬁrmation of a strong
candidate more vigorously.
The ex-ante total payoﬀ of the players, V , depends on the oﬀer:
V =
1
2
V1 +
1
2
V2
=
1− sj(π − 1)
2
,
which is positive if the strength of the nominee is smaller than 1
π−1 . Because
the ex-ante payoﬀ of the players decreases with the strength of the nominee,
the eﬃcient equilibrium requires the nominee to be as weak as possible:
k = min{ j | sj > 1
π + 1
},
where k denotes the candidate nominated in the eﬃcient equilibrium. The
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partial derivative of k with respect to π is negative. Therefore, polarization
reduces the strength of the candidate nominated in the eﬃcient equilibrium.
Note also that the range of equilibrium oﬀers in Proposition 1 deﬁnes the set
of available candidates for nomination. An increase in polarization shifts this
interval to the left, reducing the average strength of available candidates.
The game might end without appointment. The probability that the second
player will conﬁrm the nomination (i.e., the probability that an agreement
will be reached) depends on the strength of the candidate and polarization.
It can be calculated as follows:
Pr(Success in agreement) = q + (1− q)(1− p)q + (1− q)2(1− p)2q + ...
=
q
1− (1− q)(1− p)
=
1 + sj(π − 1)
2sjπ
.
The expression above decreases with s. That is, a stronger candidate lowers
the probability that an agreement will be reached.
Proposition 2. For any given level of polarization, the probability that an
agreement will be reached decreases with the strength of the nominee.
It is important to note that the eﬀect of polarization on the probability
that an agreement will be reached is ambiguous. The partial derivative of
the success probability—derived above—with respect to π is negative if and
only if sj is smaller than 1. However, there is no restriction on the strength
of the nominee in the equilibrium other than the lower boundary derived in
Proposition 1.
There is a delay in reaching agreement. The duration of the bargaining pro-
cess depends on the concession rates p and q. The expected time a nominee
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spends in the Senate conditional on being conﬁrmed can be calculated as
follows:
D =
Expected number of days given success
Pr(Success)
=
rq + 2r2q + 3r3q + ...
q + rq + r2q + ...
=
∞∑
t=0
t(1− r)rt,
where r = (1 − q)(1 − p) is the probability that the game does not end in
any particular period. Note that the expected delay in the game (i.e., the
time spent in the Senate independent of the result of the bargaining) is also
equal to D:
Expected duration of bargaining = (1− r) + 2r(1− r) + 3r2(1− r) + ...
=
∞∑
t=0
t(1− r)rt.
The following proposition summarizes the eﬀect of the strength of the nom-
inee and polarization on the time spent in the Senate.
Proposition 3. Delay in the bargaining increases with the strength of the
nominee and polarization.
Proof. The partial derivatives of p and q with respect to s are both negative.
Thus D increases with j. Both players prefer to stay in the game with
a higher probability when a stronger candidate is nominated. Similarly,
polarization increases players’ incentives to stay in the game because the
partial derivatives of p and q with respect to π are both negative.
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The strength of the nominee and polarization together determine the size of
the transfer between parties. A higher stake (i.e., a strong candidate and/or
high polarization) increases players’ incentive to stay in the game and causes
a longer delay.35
4.3 Appointment of Judges
Nominations to the federal judiciary are pivotal events in American politics.
Assignments to the Supreme Court, for example, are the most high-proﬁle
appointments that a president makes (Shipan and Shannon [2003]). Such
appointments are important for the political parties not only because federal
judges set rules based on which society functions, but also because they
promote certain political views while establishing those rules. A large body
of literature shows evidence that federal judges appointed by Democrats
(Republicans) tend to be more liberal (conservative) in their decisions.36
The federal judiciary is composed of three courts: the Supreme Court,
circuit courts of appeals, and district courts. Decisions of district courts are
subject to review by circuit courts, and the decisions of circuit courts are
subject to review by the Supreme Court. As of 2015, there are 866 federal
judgeship positions available in these courts.37
35Legal scholars make a similar argument to support term limits over life-time appointments.
For example, Calabresi and Lindgren [2006] argue that limiting life tenure would increase the
eﬃciency of the judge appointment process by reducing the political stakes in any particular
nomination.
36See, for instance, Epstein and Segal [2005], Songer and Haire [1992], and Goldman [1966].
37There are nine positions at the Supreme Court, 179 at 13 circuit courts of appeals, and 678
at 94 district courts.
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When a judgeship becomes vacant in one of the federal courts, the President
nominates a person to ﬁll the position. Before the public announcement
of the nomination, the President forwards the name of the nominee to the
American Bar Association Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary
(ABA) for further investigation. Although there is no rule mandating pres-
idents to have the clearance of the ABA, this additional screening process
has been followed since President Eisenhower.38 ABA reviews the candi-
date’s professional experience, knowledge of law, and commitment to equal
justice and issues a rating using three categories: "not qualiﬁed", "qualiﬁed",
and "well qualiﬁed" (ABA [2009]).
The nomination is sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee which consists
of 18 senators. After reviewing the nominee’s qualiﬁcations, the Committee
sends the nomination to the Senate. Each Committee member can inﬂuence
the time spent in the Committee by several means: they might ask for addi-
tional information about the nominee, request to schedule a hearing, forward
follow-up questions etc. Once the Committee completes its evaluation, the
nomination is brought to the Senate ﬂoor for voting. A nomination is still
susceptible to being blocked by opponents in the Senate ﬂoor. Because there
is no rule on how long the consideration of a nomination may last, opponents
of the nominee can extend debate to delay conﬁrmation.
The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) keeps a biographical directory of federal
judges.39 For each of the 3831 judges appointed since 1789, the directory
contains information about the judge (i.e, birth year, gender, race, ABA
score, number of appointment) and the nomination (i.e., name of the court,
nomination year, senate conﬁrmation year). FJC also reports the list of
38An exception was made by President George W. Bush. During his administration, ABA
reviewed nominees after the announcement of their nominations.
39http://www.fjc.gov.
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the failed nominations. The list includes information on the name of the
nominee, name of the court he was nominated, the date of nomination, and
the reason of failure. Failures most commonly occur when the President
does not renominate the candidate at the beginning of the new Senate term.
Sometimes presidents do not even wait to the end of the Senate term to end
the nomination and withdraw the candidate. 349 out of 444 failures occurred
because presidents either withdrew the candidate or did not renominate him
in the new Senate. There are 27 cases (one since 1989) where the Senate
rejected the nomination. Other reasons of failure include the nominee’s death
and decline of the position. Almost all of the declines occurred in 18th and
19th centuries.
FJC’s list does not include the ABA scores of the failed nominees, neither
does it publish birth year, gender, or race information of those candidates.
However, ABA has been publishing the record of ratings of all nominees since
1989. Because the full controls are available only from 1989, I choose 1989–
2014 as my sample period. For failed nominations I hand collect birth year,
gender, and race information from several sources on the Internet such as
White House press releases, obituary records, lawyer directories, and news-
papers. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of all but one nominee40 from
1989 to 2014.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
Of the 1383 nominations, 10 individuals were nominated to the Supreme
Court, 285 to circuit courts of appeals, and 1088 to district courts. 62% of
40I was not able to ﬁnd the age and race for this nominee.
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the nominees received the top score (i.e., "well qualiﬁed") from ABA.41 A
successful appointment is typically a 50-year-old white male. His ABA score
is "well qualiﬁed" and his application waits 181 days in the Senate before it
is conﬁrmed.
Polarization data is taken from the website of Keith Poole, Howard Rosen-
thal, and Christopher Hare.42 They assign polarization scores to each
Congress by using representatives’ and senators’ voting behavior, includ-
ing that on judge appointments.43 I use their "diﬀerence in party means"
measure to capture the degree of divergence between the average senators in
each party. To introduce polarization as an independent explanatory vari-
able, I use polarization scores of the House of Representatives, not of the
Senate.
First, I test whether a compromise on the strength of the candidate increases
the probability that the nomination will be conﬁrmed by the Senate (i.e.,
Proposition 2). Table 2 presents the results of probit regressions. The ﬁrst
column includes the baseline speciﬁcation with the age of the nominee as
the only explanatory variable. Columns two to ﬁve gradually increase the
number of controls. The marginal eﬀect of age on the probability of approval
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level in most speciﬁcations.
In the speciﬁcation with full controls, a one-year increase in age is associated
with a 2.3% increase in the probability of approval. Column six adds po-
larization to the regression. Its results conﬁrm the prediction of the model
that once age is controlled for, polarization is not associated with the suc-
41Three candidates, nominated by President George W. Bush, did not receive an ABA score
because their nominations were withdrawn during the evaluation process. I assign the ABA
score of "not qualiﬁed" to those three candidates. My results stay the same if I exclude these
candidates.
42http://www.voteview.com/political_polarization_2014.htm
43See Poole and Rosenthal (1997) for the composition of polarization scores.
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cess probability of the nomination. In all speciﬁcations (except the ﬁrst) the
nominee’s suitability for the post is controlled for by his ABA score. Other
controls include the type of the federal court the candidate is nominated to,
the candidate’s prior experience as a federal judge, gender, and race.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
Next, I analyze the number of days a nomination spends in the Senate.
Proposition 3 asserts that the strength of the candidate and polarization
both increase the delay. The results of the duration analysis in Table 3 are
consistent with Proposition 3. The coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1% level in the speciﬁcation with full controls. The hazard rate decreases
with the strength of the nominee and increases with polarization. That is,
the probability that the nomination will be approved in each day increases
with the age of the nominee and decreases with polarization.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
Endogeneity is a potential concern in Table 2 and 3. There might exist a fac-
tor unobservable to the econometrician that aﬀects the behavior of senators
and, indirectly, that of the President. In particular, the President might send
a stronger (weaker) candidate during such times when the Senate is more
(less) likely to accept his nominee. To address this concern, I compare the
success rates and the number of days spent in the Senate of the candidates
who were nominated on the same day.
During the sample period, 85% of the nominees for federal judge positions
were sent in batches of at least two candidates. Each batch includes four
nominees on average. There are 329 batches in total. Table 4 conﬁrms the
results obtained from the previous analysis by controlling for batch ﬁxed
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eﬀects. Probit regressions in the ﬁrst two columns show that the marginal
eﬀect of age, between the two candidates who were nominated on the same
day, on the probability of approval is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at
the 5% level. A one-year increase in age is associated with a 4.1% increase in
the probability of approval. The number of observations is only 378 because
most of the batches do not include any variation in success rates (i.e., all
the nominees in the same batch were either successful or not) and, therefore,
are dropped out from the regressions.
The last two columns report the results of analogous Cox proportional hazard
model regressions. The speciﬁcations do not include polarization because
there is no variation in polarization among the candidates in the same batch.
Consistent with the predictions of the model, the coeﬃcients of age are
positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This suggests that older
candidates spend less time in the Senate than younger candidates who are
nominated on the same day.
[TABLE 4 HERE]
4.4 Conclusion
The U.S. Constitution rests on an elaborate web of checks and balances.
Although it is widely praised, some scholars think that the system of checks
and balances slows down the government.44 Alesina and Rosenthal [2000]
blame checks and balances for the increasing polarization between the par-
ties. In their model the parties know that if they win the executive (i.e.,
Presidency), they have to compromise with the legislature (i.e., Congress).
44See, for example, Goldwin and Kaufman [1986] and Burns [1963].
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The anticipated future compromise creates an incentive for the parties to
run on extreme platforms.
This paper argues that checks and balances aﬀect the quality of political
appointments. The necessity to get the approval of the minority promotes
ineﬃciency. It forces the majority to nominate candidates that the minority
is willing to accept only because they are weak and therefore less eﬀective in
pursuing the majority’s agenda.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
count mean sd min max
Age 1383 50.15 6.24 35 69
Success 1383 0.86 0.35 0 1
Days 1383 195.79 174.47 2 1505
Male 1383 0.72 0.45 0 1
White 1383 0.78 0.41 0 1
ABA Score 1383 2.61 0.51 1 3
Court Type 1383 1.22 0.43 1 3
First Appointment 1383 0.93 0.26 0 1
Year 1383 2001 7.56 1989 2014
Senate Number 1383 107 3.78 101 113
Polarization 1383 0.88 0.15 0.63 1.10
Age is the age of the candidate at the time of the nomination. Success is 1 if the ap-
pointment is conﬁrmed in the Senate and 0 otherwise. Days is the number of days the
nomination spent in the Senate. Male is 1 if the candidate is male and 0 otherwise. White
is 1 if the candidate is white and 0 otherwise. ABA Score is 1 if the score given by the
American Bar Association to the candidate is "not qualiﬁed", 2 if it is "qualiﬁed", and 3
if it is "well qualiﬁed". Court Type is 1 if the nomination is for a district court, 2 if it is
for a circuit court of appeals, and 3 if it is for the Supreme Court. First Appointment is 1
if the candidate is not a federal judge at the time of the nomination and 0 otherwise. Year
is the year of the nomination. Senate Number is the number of the Senate to which the
nomination is sent. Polarization is the House of Representatives polarization index at the
time of the nomination. It is taken from the website of Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal,
and Christopher Hare.
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Table 2: Success Probability, Explained by Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 0.021** 0.017* 0.019** 0.019** 0.025** 0.023**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Polarization 0.453
(0.822)
ABA Score FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Court Level FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
First Appointment No No No Yes Yes Yes
Male No No No No Yes Yes
White No No No No Yes Yes
Mean dep. variable 0.862 0.862 0.862 0.862 0.862 0.862
Observations 1383 1383 1383 1383 1383 1383
Pseudo R-Squared 0.014 0.040 0.041 0.057 0.080 0.081
The table reports marginal eﬀects of probit regressions. Standard errors of marginal eﬀects
are reported in parentheses. Constant terms are included but not shown. The dependent
variable is Success which is 1 if the appointment is conﬁrmed in the Senate and 0 otherwise.
See Table 1 for the deﬁnition of the explanatory variables. Standard errors are clustered
at the Senate and Court levels. ** and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and
5% levels, respectively.
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Table 3: Number of Days Spent in the Senate, Explained by Age and Polarization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 0.019** 0.016* 0.018* 0.017* 0.019**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Polarization -2.322** -2.360** -2.465** -2.455** -2.564**
(0.665) (0.664) (0.723) (0.725) (0.734)
ABA Score FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Court Level FE No No Yes Yes Yes
First Appointment No No No Yes Yes
Male No No No No Yes
White No No No No Yes
Mean dep. variable 195.795 195.795 195.795 195.795 195.795
Observations 1383 1383 1383 1383 1383
Pseudo R-Squared 0.076 0.076 0.081 0.082 0.083
The table reports coeﬃcients, not hazard ratios, of Cox proportional hazard regressions.
Standard errors of coeﬃcients are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is
Days, i.e., the number of days a nomination spends in the Senate. See Table 1 for the
deﬁnition of the explanatory variables. Standard errors are clustered at the Senate and
Court levels. ** and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
87
Table 4: Success Probability and Number of Days Spent in the Senate, Explained
by Age, Controlling for Batch Fixed Eﬀects
Dependent Variable:
Probability of Success Number of Days
(Probit) (Cox)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 0.043** 0.041* 0.021* 0.022*
(0.014) (0.016) (0.008) (0.009)
Batch FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
ABA Score FE No Yes No Yes
Court Level FE No Yes No Yes
First Appointment No Yes No Yes
Male No Yes No Yes
White No Yes No Yes
Mean dep. variable 0.669 0.669 198.133 198.133
Observations 378 378 1174 1174
Pseudo R-Squared 0.161 0.280 0.032 0.032
The ﬁrst two columns report marginal eﬀects of probit regressions. Standard errors of
marginal eﬀects are reported in parentheses. Constant terms are included but not shown.
The dependent variable is Success which is 1 if the appointment is conﬁrmed in the Sen-
ate and 0 otherwise. A batch is deﬁned as a group of at least two candidates who were
nominated on the same day. See Table 1 for the deﬁnition of the rest of the explanatory
variables. The last two columns report coeﬃcients, not hazard ratios, of Cox propor-
tional hazard regressions. Standard errors of coeﬃcients are reported in parentheses. The
dependent variable is Days, i.e., the number of days a nomination spends in the Sen-
ate. Standard errors are clustered at the batch level in all columns. **, and * indicate
statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, and 5% levels, respectively.
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